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COUNTRY

SUBJECT

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- 1. In his keynote address before the Central Committee of the SED on 13 June 1951, the Secretary Ceneral of the Party, Walter Ulbricht, in commenting upon the outcome of the plebiscite against remilitarization, stated that the yes-vote should not be considered a mere peace vow but an expression of the will to fight German imperialism. This post-plebiscite attempt to interpret the vote, despite the fact that yes-votes had been solicited as a manifestation of a desire for peace, as an expression of preparedness to bear arms, if need be, in the fight against German imperialism, signifies an important step in the development of SED agitation toward readying the population of the DDR for vmr. The overwhelming majority of those who cast yes-votes never intended to place themselves on record as favoring a crusade against German imperialism. Ulbricht's assurance that the peace forces have already gained a decisive victory in the first battle against German imperialism will not persuade the population that their vote in fact served the purpose for which it was intended.
- 2. There are numerous indications that the SED's peace agitation campaign has become ensuared in the coils of its inherent contradictions. The leadership of the SED realized that the plebiscite's leitmotif, opposition to remilitarization in all of Germany, would have completely lost its attraction the moment the Party even hinted that remilitarization measures had been taken in the DDR. Such an admission would have unavoidably resulted in removing all restraint in popular discussion of the numerous and only thinly veiled militarization moves known to have taken place in the East Zone.

 [even a partial admission would have deprived the SED of what little popular support it still enjoys in the DDR. For this reason Ulbricht, even in his speech on 13 June 1951, blandly maintained: "There is no remilitarization in the DDR".

the problem of changing from peace agitation to a preparedness campaign is bound to be one of the most difficult for the SED Politbüro to solve, and Ulbricht's latest disavowal of DDR remilitarization proves that the solution has not as yet been found.

4. Several months ago Politbüro member Fred Oelssner, addressing the student body of the SED Karl Marx Academy, expressed concern that the Party's fight for peace had assumed pacifist characteristics. In the same address, Colssner stated that the slogan "Schmeisst die Laffen in die Elbe" (throw the arms into the Elbe River) will have to be dropped, because "we can make good use of tanks". In his speech of 13 June, Ulbricht decried the slogan "Ohne uns",

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because it will not preserve peace. Instead the slogan "Mit uns dagegen" should be adopted. *

- 5. A representative segment of SED functionaries at the Karl Mark Academy empressed the following views on the advisability of launching a prevaredness campaign at the present time:
 - a. Current reace agitation slogans, especially in view of Western German relitical developments, carry greater weight than would an outright declaration that the DDR now must prepare for war. Such a drastic change in the agitation line would be opposed by the population.
 - b. The East Zone population, in all its strata, is by no means aware, let alone reconciled to the fact, that in a new war it will have to fight on the side of the Soviets.
 - c. Despite the fact that the East German repulation is mentally unprepared for the outbreak of war at this time, the meace campaign cannot be discontinued. Discontinuation would result in the immediate loss of the Party's most important allies, unreliable though they may be: the cosmopolitans (Weltbürger), Friends (Quakers), and pacifist organizations, as well as large parts of the DDR population.
 - d. If war breaks out, the SED may have to relinquish persuasion and use force. Admittedly, an army of volunteers is to be preferred to a conscripted army, yet no great illusions should be entertained regarding the number of volunteers. In this respect only SED members and part of the FDJ could be relied upon.

the creation of new agitation slogans by the SEE Polithtro in the near future. They will be based upon the SED's principal theses regarding the revival of German imperialism and the threat to Western and Eastern Europe posel by an alliance between German and American imperialism. They will state in effect that the DDR, the People's Democracies and the USSR are directly threatened and that security measures will have to be taken.

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